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Since 1994 election outcomes in the Western Cape have been examined 
through analyses of the ‘coloured vote’. These explanations, which are 
premised on the racially based motivations of voters, feed into the choices, 
rhetoric and behaviour of political parties. Besides inadvertently providing 
justification for racially inflammatory campaign strategies they allow parties 
to neglect their duty to give voters adequate information. In this article I 
provide an overview of voting trends and the political developments which 
have underpinned these patterns. I argue that it is not the nature of the 
electorate but national political developments and political parties, through 
their behaviour and campaigns, that are responsible for gains and losses and 
for the dramatic political changes in the province. I further argue that it is 
precisely because racial identity is so salient in the Western Cape that parties 
need to move towards more inclusive campaign strategies.
INTROdUCTION
The Western Cape is a politically unique province where electoral trends stand in 
sharp contrast to those in the rest of South Africa. While national outcomes have 
been predictable, returning the African National Congress (ANC) to power with 
large majorities, outcomes in the Western Cape have been far less predictable, 
with all democratic elections being highly contested. This has resulted in three 
different political parties (namely the National Party – NP, which later became 
the New National Party – NNP; the ANC and the democratic Alliance – dA) 
assuming power in the province. There is no certainty about the election outcome 
prior to the election, as is the case at national level. 
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The reason for this alternation in power is said to lie with the coloured 
majority in the province. Breytenbach (1999, p 117), for example, argued that the 
coloured vote was of special significance ‘because the outcome of the Western Cape 
hinged very much on this factor’. Perceptions of the importance of the ‘coloured 
vote’ have resulted in campaigning that often encompasses unintentional or 
deliberate racial mobilisation and inflammatory political rhetoric. 
Explanations of election outcomes and voting patterns in the Western 
Cape (as elsewhere) tend to revolve around racial fault lines and the racially 
based motivations of voters. These explanations in turn feed into the choices 
and actions of political parties. For example, Reynolds (1999, p 190) noted that 
in the 1999 election both the ANC and the NNP fielded coloured candidates for 
the premiership ‘because it reflected the political reality that coloured voters are 
in the majority in the Western Cape’. Nijzink & Jacobs (2000, p 39) note that the 
ANC in the Western Cape engineered a number of high profile defections of NNP 
politicians ‘in a careful strategy to make inroads among coloured voters’. In 2009 
this remained the case. 
daniel & Southall (2009, p 268) note that the ANC made a series of decisions 
relating to Ebrahim Rasool ‘to make up lost ground among coloureds’ and that 
the selection by the Congress of the People (Cope) of Allan Boesak as the party’s 
premier candidate was a significant blow to the ANC because he ‘retained a major 
following especially from the coloured community’. Such explanations allow the 
contesting political parties to justify racialised campaigning and raise the question 
of whether election outcomes in the Western Cape are the result primarily of the 
actions of voters or of political parties. 
Thus, a critical component of any analysis of elections and voting in South 
Africa and, specifically, in the Western Cape, is the role of identity in determining 
voting patterns. Analysts such as Schlemmer (1999, p 288) see South African 
voter motivations as ‘determined by symbolic or identity concerns’, resulting in 
election outcomes being described as assuming the quality of a ‘racial or ethnic 
census’. Friedman (2005, p 5) argues that while South African elections are not 
simplistic ethnic censuses elections are not determined by policy issues. According 
to Friedman (2005, p 3) ‘voter preferences are shaped by considerations other than 
competing technical solutions to economic and social problems’ because South 
Africans vote on the basis of race, language and religion. Others have challenged 
this view, arguing that values, perceived interests and judgements as well as many 
other factors have important effects on partisan support (Eldridge & Seekings 
1995; Mattes & Gouws 1998; Mattes 1995; Mattes & Piombo 2001; Mattes, Taylor 
& Africa 1999; Habib & Naidu 1999; Hoeane 2004). 
A significant problem is that the starting point of all these analyses is the 
behavioural motivations and/or demographic characteristics of the electorate. 
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This preoccupation with individual decisions is flawed because, as Sniderman 
(2000, pp 68-69) argues, political institutions – rather than voters – fix and organise 
the confusion of politics. While individual decision-making processes are critically 
important, voters are only one part of the electoral equation; political parties and 
the choices they offer constitute the other part. This raises concerns about the 
adequacy of accounts which view election outcomes as primarily determined by 
the characteristics of the electorate. 
Another more serious problem created by this debate is that it opens up 
the space for political parties to abscond from their duty to provide voters with 
adequate information. If Friedman is correct that considerations other than 
competing solutions to economic and social problems shape voter preferences 
parties need not defend their records or provide information about how they will 
deal with the problems facing the electorate. 
In this article I will examine voting trends and political developments in 
the Western Cape to offer some insight into whether the outcomes are primarily 
dependent on voters or parties.
THE CONTEXT 
The Western Cape is a demographically unique province, with coloured voters 
forming the majority. According to the South African Institute of Race Relations’s 
South African Survey of 2007/2008 the total population of the Western Cape was 
4 540 286, with more than half (2 437 741) coloured, just under a quarter (1 076 194) 
African, 978 094 white and 48 257 Indian. The 2007/2008 survey also estimated 
that 55.3 per cent of people in the Western Cape speak Afrikaans, 23.7 per cent 
speak isiXhosa and 19.3 per cent speak English. However, it should be noted 
that the Afrikaans spoken on the Cape Flats is quite different from the Afrikaans 
spoken in the suburbs – in other words, there is a clear distinction between ‘white 
Afrikaans’ and ‘coloured Afrikaans’. 
data from round four of the Afrobarometer survey in South Africa reveal 
a lower level of party identification in the Western Cape than in other regions 
in South Africa. By the end of 2008, 60 per cent of the South African electorate 
indicated that they felt close to a political party. As Figure 1 shows, the Western 
Cape was the only province where less than half (48%) of the respondents said 
they felt close to a political party compared to more than 70 per cent in the Free 
State, Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga and 60 per cent or more in the North 
West, KwaZulu-Natal and the Northern Cape. Gauteng and Limpopo also had 
‘lukewarm’ levels of identification, with just over half of the respondents saying 
they identified with a political party. These ‘non-partisan’ voters in the Western 
Cape are more likely to be open to persuasion during election campaigns.
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Figure 1
Party identification by province (2008)
Source: Afrobarometer 2008. Sample size 2 400.
At the same time, the turnout in the Western Cape has been higher than that 
in other provinces. Voter registration and turnout there has been continuously 
high compared to national patterns. At the national level turnout has declined 
sharply since the first democratic election, in 1994. Participation as a proportion 
of the voting age population (VAP) declined from 86 per cent in 1994 to 72 per 
cent in 1999. It then declined more dramatically, to 58 per cent, in 2004, increasing 
slightly, to 60 per cent, in 2009 (Schulz-Herzenberg 2009, p 26). Thus, participation 
in national elections, counted as a percentage of VAP, decreased substantially 
between 1994 and 2004 while turnout, as a proportion of VAP, has been consistently 
high in the Western Cape, where it declined from 89 per cent in 1994 to 70 per 
cent in 1999, increasing to 73 per cent in 2004 and 75 per cent in 2009.
Table 1
Voting age population, registration and turnout in the Western Cape
 Registered Votes cast Estimated turnout
1994 NA 2 137 742 88.90%
1999 1 864 019 1 616 179 69.70%
2004 2 220 283 1 621 835 73.40%
2009 2 634 439 1 987 777 75.45%
Source: Reynolds 1994, 1999; Piombo 2005; daniel & Southall 2009
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These unique features combine to create extremely competitive elections, 
notably in an attempt to capture the coloured vote. A high turnout combined 
with an uncertain outcome typically results in competitive elections and 
greater accountability. Whether these competitive elections resulting in the 
alternation of power have produced greater responsiveness or accountability or 
increased instability is an open question which merits a separate investigation. 
Unfortunately, the perceived salience of race and the importance of the coloured 
vote have negative implications for the behaviour and campaign strategies of 
political parties, which, in their attempts to capture the coloured vote, make 
decisions in terms of what they perceive will appeal to coloured voters. The race 
issue also results in campaigning that includes appeals by the contesting political 
parties to racial prejudice. 
COMPARING NATIONAL ANd PROVINCIAL OUTCOMES
At the national level concerns have been raised about the negative implications 
of declining levels of voter participation in the context of continuous electoral 
dominance by the ANC. The ANC’s proportion of the vote, taken as a proportion 
of total votes cast, increased from 62 per cent in 1994 to 66 per cent in 1999, to 70 
per cent in 2004, dropping back to 66 per cent in 2009. Votes cast for opposition 
parties decreased from 32 per cent in 1994 to 24 per cent in 1999 and 17 per cent in 
2004, increasing to 20 per cent in 2009 (Schulz-Herzenberg 2009, p 26). As Mattes 
(2005, p 106) indicates, turnout trends and voting patterns are not unrelated. 
Votes cast for the ANC (viewed as a proportion of votes cast by all eligible voters) 
decreased dramatically between 1994 and 2009. Piombo (2005, p 279) also argues 
that ‘the decreased share of the vote earned by the opposition as a whole would 
suggest that it is mainly opposition voters who stayed at home’. By 2009 more 
people stayed at home than voted for the ANC at the national level.
 
Table 2
Election results in the Western Cape
 1994 1999 2004 2009
NP/NNP 1 138 242     609 612     170 469  NA 
ANC 705 576     668 106     709 052   620 918 
DP/DA 141 970     189 183     424 832  1 012 568 
ID  NA  NA     122 867    92 116 
Cope  NA  NA  NA   152 356 
Source: Independent Electoral Commission 1994; Reynolds 1994, 1999; Piombo 2005; daniel & Southall 2009 
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The Western Cape, on the other hand, has experienced alternation of power, with 
three different parties – the NP, the ANC and the dA – having been in power. This 
alternation of power has occurred in the context of fairly high turnout levels. As 
seen in Table 2, by 2009 the dA had won an outright majority, steadily increasing 
its proportion of the vote across the four elections.
THE FIRST dEMOCRATIC ELECTION (1994)
In the first democratic election, held in 1994, the NP won an outright majority 
in the Western Cape – 53.3 per cent of the votes for the Western Cape provincial 
legislature against the ANC’s 33 per cent. The dP only secured 1.7 per cent of the 
national vote and 6.6 per cent at provincial level. The African Christian democratic 
Party (ACdP) won 1.2 per cent in the Western Cape while other parties mustered 
a combined 5.9 per cent. 
The provincial result in the Western Cape, which put the NP into power under 
the leadership of Hernus Kriel, shocked many activists and, indeed, many analysts, 
who had presumed that coloured voters, scarred by the effects of apartheid, would 
secure an ANC government in the province. Language and culture were cited as 
reasons for the turn of events. With regard to the democratic Party (dP, later the 
democratic Alliance – dA) Welsh (1994, p 107) labelled its results ‘an unmitigated 
disaster’, ascribing this to the fact that the election had assumed the character of 
a presidential race between Nelson Mandela of the ANC and F W de Klerk of the 
NP. Welsh (1994, p 115) estimated that the fact that the dP had only won about 
3 per cent of the coloured vote was a result of its inability to ‘break out of the 
urban, English-speaking, white, middle-class confines of liberalism’.
The result was labelled a racial/ethnic census with the coloured community 
feeling happier with Afrikaner than rather than African nationalism (see, eg, 
Johnson (1996, p 310)). This claim was questioned by authors such as Mattes, 
Giliomee & James (1996) and Eldridge & Seekings (1995), who raised questions 
about the difficulties of making a priori predictions about so-called ‘middle 
groups’ like coloured and Indian voters. Eldridge & Seekings (1995, p 2) believe 
the Western Cape posed several specific challenges to the ethnic/racial census 
argument, arguing that, at the outset of the election campaign only one-third 
or one-half of the provincial electorate expressed the intention to vote for their 
‘natural’ racial parties (depending on how one decides which parties were the 
voters’ ‘natural’ choices) and that pre-election polling data suggested that voters’ 
attitudes on a range of issues, not simply their ethnic identity, underlay their 
voting intentions. Furthermore, Mattes, Giliomee & James (1996, p 146) argue 
that: (i) if the importance of race emanated from the role given to it by apartheid 
one would expect the election to pit both coloured and black victims of apartheid 
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against their former white oppressors; (ii) coloured people did not cast their vote 
monolithically for one party; and (iii) the three largest parties did not derive an 
overwhelming proportion of their support from any single racial group.
Another explanation related to an ‘affinity’ or ‘closeness’ between coloured 
and white voters who share Afrikaans as a language (Reynolds 1994). This 
explanation was empirically refuted by Mattes, Giliomee & James (1996, p 146) 
based on survey data which showed that party preferences among coloured 
people differed little by language. 
Putting aside language and cultural affinity, the 1994 election results in 
the Western Cape make sense if one considers the underlying fears of voters 
revealed by opinion polls conducted in the province in december 1993. The NP 
took advantage of these fears through an extremely effective election campaign. 
A provincially representative opinion poll of  respondents conducted for the 
Institute for Multi-party democracy in december 1993 revealed a significant 
concern about violence. Overall, 53 per cent of respondents cited violence as their 
primary concern.
Importantly, as shown in Figure 2, 27 per cent considered that the ANC 
was likely to initiate violence. As indicated by Africa (1996, p 49) this was 
almost on a par with the 29 per cent who felt that the right-wing Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) would initiate violence. Furthermore, 34 per cent 
saw the ANC as being responsible for encouraging political violence compared 
to 7 per cent who thought the NP was doing so. At the same time, almost half 
(49%) felt that the NP was discouraging political violence, while 23 per cent felt 
the ANC was doing so.
To be sure, these fears were highly racialised and the NP did a sterling job 
of capitalising on them, using inflammatory campaign rhetoric throughout a 
predominantly negative campaign against the ANC which depicted the ANC as a 
violent and dangerous party that would plunge South Africa into a state of chaos. 
According to Mattes, Giliomee & James (1996, p 133) the main aim of the NP was 
to force voters to determine which party would be most trustworthy to run the 
government and therefore painted a stark choice between a new, competent and 
trustworthy NP and an old, dangerous ANC that could not govern. 
The vast series of endorsement-type advertisements for the NP utilised 
images of terrorism, intimidation, burning of collaborators, boycotts and strike 
action, referring to ‘the comrades’ as being responsible for violence in the 
country. The negative depiction of the ANC as being linked to ‘the comrades’ was 
strengthened by scores of street posters with the slogan ‘Stop the comrades’. The 
NP’s campaign was bolstered by events surrounding the squatter occupation of 
houses built for coloured people (Giliomee 1994, pp 66-67). Another of the NP’s 
key campaign messages was that the economic policy of the ANC and the South 
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African Communist Party (SACP) would bring the country to its knees, and that 
the NP had the experience and ability to create order and economic prosperity 
out of chaos (Giliomee 1994, p 62). The NP emphasised the link between the ANC 
and the SACP by focusing on the dangers of communism, the number of SACP 
candidates on the ANC’s list of candidates, and their influence on the ANC. 
At the same time, a reservoir of positive emotions was directed towards 
F W de Klerk for ushering in a new era in South African politics. According to 
Breytenbach (1999, p 117), as early as 1991 an opinion poll revealed that 55 per cent 
of coloured voters would prefer to have de Klerk as leader, compared to 3 per cent 
who preferred Nelson Mandela. As Nijzink & Jacobs (2000, p 37) indicate, ‘for 
coloureds, de Klerk seemed to be the embodiment of the transformed National 
Party’.
The ANC’s campaign revolved primarily around the party’s proposed 
Reconstruction and development Programme (RdP) which, among other things 
spelled out a succession of measures to create jobs through public works (Lodge 
1994, p 30). According to Silke & Schire (1994, p 133) the ANC’s detailed policy 
‘open plan’ advertisements, based on the tenets of the RdP, which emphasised 
jobs, workers’ rights, land reforms, housing policies and welfare, portrayed 
the party as ready to govern and as well prepared on a broad range of policy 
issues. 
Figure 2
Perceptions of who might start violence (December 1993)
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The second phase of the ANC’s campaign, described as ‘attack, contrast and 
endorsement’, comprised attacks on the NP, contrasting the ANC’s RdP with the 
NP’s alleged lack of a plan, and endorsement of the ANC by community leaders 
at rallies and in the press. The ‘contrast’ component was part of a national shift in 
strategy, but the Western Cape put a particularly aggressive spin on it, emphasising 
attack (Eldridge & Seekings 1995, p 15). A series of advertisements focused on the 
fact that ‘unemployment has struck at the heart of coloured, African and Indian 
communities in the Western Cape. The National Party’s disastrous economic 
policy is responsible for this.’ 
Attention was paid to the NP’s record of forced removals, corruption, 
involvement in ‘third force’ activities, covert operations it undertook, its backing 
from ‘Witdoek’ vigilante leaders and the support of Hernus Kriel, the NP’s 
candidate for premier of the province, for the notorious Section 29 law, which 
related to detention conditions. As Eldridge & Seekings (1995, pp 15-16) point 
out the final phase of the ANC’s campaign ‘was marked by intensified attacks 
on the NP, further endorsements by community leaders, and upbeat messages 
about the future under an ANC government’. 
The NP’s campaign convinced voters in the Western Cape that the ANC 
would allow the country to descend into anarchy. On the other hand, the ANC’s 
focus on issues such as ‘third force’ activities in the Western Cape probably 
counted against it. It is likely that the issue of ‘third force’ activities had meaning 
for activists and black citizens but little relevance for white and coloured people 
– none of the respondents in the abovementioned study by the Institute for Multi-
party democracy named a third force as being responsible for starting violence.
Thus, in the Western Cape the National Party was more successful than the 
ANC in mobilising people to vote for it. Given the concerns about violence and 
the pre-existing belief that the ANC would be most likely to start it, the NP’s 
campaign messages about the ANC’s involvement in boycotts, strikes, arson and 
other acts of violence fell on fertile ground. 
THE 1999 ELECTION: REALIGNMENT IN THE WESTERN CAPE
By the second democratic election the dP had made modest advances in the 
province, doubling its share of the vote to 12 per cent. However, the contest 
remained primarily one between the ANC and the NP, now renamed the New 
National Party (NNP). Following the 1999 election the distribution of power 
shifted dramatically, with the NNP losing its majority status. Its share of the vote 
dropped by 15 per cent to 38 per cent – 4 per cent less than that of the ANC. The 
ANC increased its share of the vote by 9.1 per cent to 42 per cent. These massive 
shifts took place in the context of fairly high turnout levels. 
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Yet the campaign period was far less remarkable than that in 1994. As Habib 
& Naidu (1999, p 190) note, ‘South Africa’s second democratic election was very 
much a placid affair’. during the 1999 election campaign there was an increased 
focus on ‘the issues’. Taylor & Hoeane (1999, p 133) note that all the political 
parties addressed the key social issues of job creation, crime, housing, education, 
service delivery, and corruption. This political realignment pointed to the idea 
that explanations of voting patterns in the Western Cape are deficient. The notion 
that coloured votes were based primarily on the cultural and/or linguistic affinity 
between coloured and whites was challenged by the fact that the pendulum had 
swung in the ANC’s favour. 
On the campaign front, the ANC in the Western Cape, learning from its 
campaign-trail mistakes of 1994, took a softer approach, with appeals for voters in 
the province simply to give it a chance. As Lodge (1999, p 66) indicates, particular 
emphasis was placed on ‘listening’– party leaders concentrated on meetings with 
select groups of community and religious leaders, while branch members focused 
on household visits. 
In addition to a new name, the NNP adopted a new multiracial focus. 
A poster with its leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk at the centre was at pains to 
show that the party was fielding candidates of other races (coloured and black). 
The NNP manifesto for 1999 professed that it was the most multiracial party 
in South Africa, representing ‘a broad and inclusive South African patriotism 
that transcends race, language and religion’ (New National Party 1999, p 213). 
While the intentions behind this contention were noble, they communicated a 
substantial break with the party’s previous uncompromising commitment to 
‘separate development’. The new focus also sat uncomfortably with the NNP’s 
emphasis on protecting minority rights. The National Party’s decision to change 
its name was not necessarily a good strategic choice. It signalled an admission 
that it had erred and needed to improve.
In 1999 the spotlight was turned on the dangers of one-party dominance 
and a concentration of power if the ANC were to gain a two-thirds majority. 
These arguments were primarily highlighted by the democratic Party (dP) and 
echoed by the NNP and the United democratic Movement. Under the leadership 
of Tony Leon the dP built its strategy around ‘robust opposition’ with a focus 
on government failings, incompetence, corruption and a lack of urgency (Schrire 
2001, p 142). According to Welsh (1999, p 91) the dP, in 1996, began to fashion a 
new approach to election campaigns, which involved the presentation of two clear 
competing visions: the ANC’s collectivism and the dP’s democratic liberalism. 
This formed the basis of its aggressive ‘fight back’ campaign in the 1999 elections. 
Posters with a serious-looking Leon cited an article printed in Die Burger in which 
Marthinus van Schalkwyk was quoted as saying that ‘… a situation can develop 
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where the NNP … can serve in an ANC-led government on invitation’. It urged 
voters not to let the NNP disappoint them again and stated that ‘only Tony Leon 
and the dP have ruled out a coalition with the ANC’.
What then accounts for the dramatic shifts in the Western Cape? In the 1999 
election organisational and political changes probably mattered more to voters 
than campaign messages. It is likely that several other factors underpinned the 
political changes that occurred in the province.
Firstly, voters in the province could observe the fact that the dire predictions 
of the National Party for South Africa under ANC rule had failed to materialise. 
In its 1994 campaign the NP had painted a bleak future for South Africa under 
an ANC-led government. Voters in the Western Cape could watch the ANC as 
incumbents at national level. Instead of descent into chaos, post-1994 South Africa 
became a beacon of political hope around the world. As Magubane (2000, p 28) 
aptly notes, ‘the “new” South Africa was born amidst profound relief, a palpable 
desire for reconciliation, overwhelming optimism and genuinely high hopes for 
the future’. 
The Mandela era ushered in a new constitutional framework which included 
the protection of a broad range of rights, the development of mechanisms for 
public participation in government processes and the establishment of various 
protective institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, the Auditor-
General, the Public Service Commission and the Public Protector. By 1999 the 
government had undergone a fundamental and radical overhaul (Calland 
1999, p 1). 
This positive image was further cemented by Nelson Mandela’s heroic 
international status. Indeed, the primary thrust of Mandela’s administration was 
national reconciliation. Mandela personally undertook a series of imaginative 
reconciliatory gestures such as visiting the man who had prosecuted him during 
the Rivonia Trial and rallying South Africans around the 1995 Rugby World Cup 
Final (Lodge 2002, p 14). Lodge indicates that Mandela’s stature among South 
Africans remained undiminished and public satisfaction with his performance 
as president stood at 80 per cent just prior to the 1999 election.
At the same time, a second set of national-level events had undermined the 
credibility of the NNP. In May 1996 F W de Klerk had informed a packed press 
conference that he was taking the NP out of the Government of National Unity 
(Calland 1999, p 6). Calland notes that this was not a unanimous decision – many 
NP leaders wished to stay in power. In September 1997 de Klerk resigned and 
was replaced by Van Schalkwyk (Southall 1998, p 462). According to Breytenbach 
(1999, p 119) de Klerk’s absence as the party leader weakened the NNP among 
coloured voters and threatened its retention of its Afrikaner support base, while 
attracting support from other quarters. 
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The question of who to target as its support base aggravated divisions within 
the party and ultimately resulted in the resignation of Roelf Meyer, who had 
played a central role in the negotiation process and in developing the interim 
constitution. Meyer had advocated the dissolution of the NP and the formation 
of a coalition movement made up of all opposition parties (Ndletyana 1999, p 
183). Furthermore, according to Welsh (1999, p 91), the NNP was now reduced 
to a relatively small opposition party ‘which could no longer offer the patronage, 
protection and privilege it could when it was the ruling party’. These events 
damaged the party’s image. 
Thirdly, the woes inflicted on the NNP by organisational problems and 
defections were exacerbated by the steady outpouring of horrific revelations to 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) about atrocities committed by 
the apartheid government (Welsh 1999, p 91). Following an extensive process 
of statement-taking, public meetings and visits by fieldworkers to various 
communities, most of the 76 public hearings were televised (Lodge 2002, p 180). 
As Breytenbach (1999, p 119) indicates, some NNP supporters were ‘shamed by 
the revelations of the TRC’.
All these elements eroded the NNP’s support base in the 1999 elections while 
the dP made marginal inroads with more focused campaign efforts. The ANC, by 
means of its softer provincial campaign approach, began to gain the confidence of 
voters as they watched ANC incumbents at national level. Nonetheless a NNP/
dA alliance kept the ANC out of power in the Western Cape and Marthinus van 
Schalkwyk became the new premier.
THE 2004 ELECTION: A SHIFT IN PERCEPTIONS
By 2004 the democratic Party, now the democratic Alliance, had made sizeable 
inroads in the Western Cape, increasing its support base to 27 per cent. The ANC 
also increased its support base marginally, from 42 per cent to 45 per cent, just 
short of an outright majority. The NNP’s share of the vote crumbled to 11 per 
cent. The newly formed Independent democrats (Id) under the leadership of 
Patricia de Lille, formerly of the Pan Africanist Congress, won 7.8 per cent of the 
vote in the Western Cape. 
In 2004, as in 1994 and 1999, national events had a significant impact on the 
political landscape of the Western Cape. The democratic Party and New National 
Party announced in June 2000 that they would join up as the democratic Alliance, 
with the aim of building a political movement that would effectively challenge 
the ANC for political power. The dP’s Tony Leon became the national leader and 
NNP’s Marthinus van Schalkwyk the deputy leader. The objectives of the dA 
were to present a challenge to the ANC’s electoral dominance and to strengthen 
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opposition politics. The merger was never institutionalised and by November 
2001 the alliance had sprung apart, primarily due to dissatisfaction among former 
NNP officeholders with Leon’s leadership (Lodge 2002, p 157). Kotze (2001, p 
123) indicates that the dP and NNP had no shared historical roots and very little 
ideological common ground. The merger and subsequent split had stretched 
the NNP’s resources and the dA had effectively absorbed the NNP’s grassroots 
structures (Schulz-Herzenberg 2005, p 166). The NNP’s next move was to enter 
into an alliance with the ANC. 
There was also a new dynamic. Given the fact that these were the third 
democratic elections parties were beginning to develop ‘track records’. Voters 
could start to assess the consistency of party rhetoric and the outlandish 
inconsistencies in NNP rhetoric appear to have finalised the demise of the party. 
By 2004 the NNP, in coalition with its former arch-enemy the ANC, preached a 
campaign message that completely contradicted its messages of 1994 and 1999. 
The party’s primary campaign theme in 2004 was that it provided a voice for 
voters via the coalition arrangement with the ANC, which, it maintained, had 
enabled it to strengthen its position and thus provide minority voters with a voice 
in government, though it was still distinct from the ANC. 
The main thrust of the NNP’s election campaign in 2004 was that the party 
would provide access to government decision-making processes and resources. 
It argued that the dA’s aggressive style of politics was unsuitable and damaging 
to democracy and located itself as the mediator between voters and the ANC. 
Thus, the NNP’s campaign message of co-operation with the ANC was completely 
inconsistent with preceding NP campaigns, which had been predominantly 
negative, depicting the ANC as a dangerous, violent, authoritarian, politically 
intolerant party with an economic policy that would bring the country to its knees, 
therefore making it not fit to govern (Giliomee 1994; Eldridge & Seekings 1995). 
The collaborative arrangement with the ANC, as well as the assertion that 
this would benefit voters, essentially communicated that the NNP’s previous 
assessment of the ANC had been completely inaccurate. This is particularly 
important given Iyengar & Valentino’s (2000, p 110) argument that campaign 
communication is most persuasive when it interacts with voters’ prevailing 
expectations and evokes what voters already ‘know’. It is likely that these 
messages were regarded as farcical and therefore ineffective. Not only had the 
incumbent ANC government at national level proved the NNP’s claims to be 
inaccurate, the NNP now expected voters to believe that it would provide ‘a voice’ 
for them in government through the co-operative arrangement with the ANC.
Literature on the subject also informs us that campaign themes should be 
congruent with previous campaigns and messages within a campaign period 
should be well blended and internally consistent (Schnur 1999; Weaver 1996). Not 
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only was the 2004 campaign incongruent with its predecessors, there was also 
a lack of internal consistency among the messages the NNP presented to voters 
during the 2004 campaign. The core messages, that the party had strengthened 
its position through its alliance with the ANC but that it was distinct from and 
would hold the ANC to account on issues such as the death penalty, abortion and 
affirmative action, were contradictory. As Southall & daniel (2005, p 48) state, the 
messages that the NNP was committed to constructive opposition, reconciliation 
and political consensus; that it differed from the ANC on key aspects such as 
being tougher on crime and the handling of Zimbabwe and that its presence in 
government gave important leverage to minority groups was as confusing as 
it was unconvincing. Schulz-Herzenberg (2005) also correctly points out that 
the NNP’s stated ideological shift to the centre of the political spectrum was 
undermined by its overall policy stance.
On the other hand, the ANC ran a largely positive campaign on the theme 
of the celebration of ten years of democracy. It emphasised its achievements, 
acknowledged its shortcomings, and drew attention to its strength, experience 
and commitment. The main thrust of the ANC’s 2004 campaign was that it was 
the only party able to improve the lives of ordinary people in South Africa. A key 
message related to its partnership with ‘the people’ in pursuing this goal. The 
campaign was significantly consistent with those of the elections of 1994 and 1999 
with its theme of ‘a better life for all’and the presentation of the role of the ANC 
in ending apartheid as well as the importance of contracts and partnerships with 
various social actors. As Lodge (2005, p117) indicates, the language used also 
revived the ‘people centred’ rhetoric of the Reconstruction and development 
Programme. However, slight changes were also evident. In the founding elections 
of 1994 a large focus was on the end of apartheid, as embodied in the slogan ‘Now 
is the time’, whereas in 2004 a more practical and hands-on approach was used 
to present the ANC as competent in its role as the government of the day. The 
message that ‘the tide has turned’ became institutionalised, indicating to voters 
that the ANC-led government was successful in ushering in change in South 
Africa (Booysen 2005, p 131). 
In 2004 the dA contended that a vote for the NNP was as good as a vote for 
the ANC. It further contrasted itself with the ANC and other opposition parties, 
communicating the message to voters that other parties lacked sound policies, 
competence and integrity or that they simply served to fracture the opposition. 
The primary theme of the dA’s 2004 campaign was ‘South Africa deserves better’. 
The party’s message strategy was three-pronged, ranging from the projection of 
its strengths and its policy alternatives to highlighting ANC weaknesses with 
reference to integrity and policy as well as the weaknesses of other opposition 
parties (Booysen 2005, p 136). 
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The dA’s primary assertion in 2004 was that it had the capacity and the 
appropriate policies to deal with South Africa’s key problems. It stated that it was 
ready to take office because it had the means to deliver. It presented itself as an 
alternative government rather than merely an opposition party (Booysen 2005, 
p 137). In its manifesto, entitled A Better South Africa, the party gave a detailed 
outline of its policy positions (democratic Alliance 2004). The manifesto presented 
the dA as South Africa’s only serious alternative to the ANC, stating that the 
party was the only political organisation other than the ANC with political reach 
in every province and was therefore capable of forming the central pillar of a 
democratic alternative. 
The manifesto acknowledged the progress and achievements of the past ten 
years but argued that ‘for millions of South Africans, these successes have been 
overshadowed by the ANC government’s broken contract with the people of South 
Africa: its failure to deliver the better life it promised in 1994’. The manifesto was 
also particularly critical of the ANC government’s response to HIV and AIdS and 
argued that the ANC had accumulated power for itself while leaving the people 
of South Africa behind. 
Overall, the dA’s campaign was consistent with its previous campaigns, 
particularly in key areas such as the focus on the electoral dominance of the 
ANC, criticisms of ANC performance and the presentation of the dA as the only 
viable alternative to the ANC. The goal of a basic income grant represented a key 
shift. Analysts also point out that the emphasis on policy alternatives was a new 
area for the party (davis 2005; Southall & daniel 2005). Furthermore, the party’s 
campaign style was marginally softer than it had been during the 1999 ‘Fight Back’ 
campaign. However, the ambiguous subtext of the dA’s slogans and its messages 
are likely to have offended some voters. While it probably intended to refer to 
changes in the material living conditions of voters, the slogan ‘Vote dA for real 
change’ raised questions such as what type of change there had been prior to this 
and was the change from apartheid to democracy artificial. Furthermore, inherent 
in its theme (that South Africa deserved better) was criticism of the ANC. This 
slogan automatically raised the question: better than what? As Booysen (2005) 
argues the slogans were interpreted ‘as being polarizing’. Edighji (2004) went as 
far as saying that the dA predicated its election campaign on ‘fear-mongering’ 
and ‘alarmism’. 
While the dA gave out a series of messages presenting itself as a policy-
oriented alternative ready to sort out the ANC’s failed policies, there was a lack 
of internal consistency among the messages. As Booysen (2005, p 132) indicates, 
the party’s policy solutions were ‘overwhelmingly free market, which constituted 
a policy environment that was essentially incompatible with the party’s proposal 
for a basic income grant’. Southall & daniel (2005, p 50) also argue, correctly, that 
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adopting ‘an unconvincing, somewhat populist platform to attract blacks’ while 
simultaneously campaigning ‘against black economic empowerment, affirmative 
action and minimum wages in favour of a largely unrestricted free market and 
more flexible labour laws’ was contradictory. 
Voters in the Western Cape heard the message that a vote for the NNP was, 
in effect, a vote for the ANC and opted to vote for the ANC. Opposition voters 
in 2004 did not feel pressure to vote against the ANC. Votes cast for the ANC 
climbed to 709 052 and the party took control of the provincial government in 
the Western Cape under the premiership of Ebrahim Rasool.
2009: A BREAKTHROUGH FOR THE dA
2009 was the dA’s year in the Western Cape. With the NNP absorbed into the ANC 
the contest was now between the dA and the ANC. However, a dA victory was 
not a given – the gains it made in 2004 were seen as tentative and its successes 
ambiguous given the ANC’s gains at the cost of the dA in areas such as Mitchells 
Plain (Booysen 2005, p143). There was no direct transfer of power from the NP 
to the dA. 
In 1999 and 2004 the ANC had made significant inroads in the Western Cape, 
gradually gaining the trust of voters. Opposition voters did not feel a sense of 
urgency about keeping the ANC out of power. And as daniel & Southall (2009, 
p 237) state the ANC in the Western Cape had a significant block of loyal coloured 
voters. Again arguments emerged about racial polarisation in the province. 
daniel & Southall (2009, p 268) assert that ‘the dA’s victory came from markedly 
increasing its vote among the coloured community leaving the province as racially 
fractured as ever’. 
The ANC’s share of the vote dropped from 709 052 to 620 918 (31.5%). 
Whether ANC voters had opted out and abstained or switched allegiance and 
voted for the dA was immaterial, the dA received an outright majority, securing 
51.4 per cent. Newcomer Cope secured 7.7 per cent of the vote in the Western 
Cape after it became bogged down in a series of controversies regarding its 
policy directions and presented a ‘low-key design-as-you-go’ defensive election 
campaign (Booysen 2009, p 95-99). Nevertheless, Cope managed to surpass the 
Id in the Western Cape – the Id only obtained 4.7 per cent of the 2009 provincial 
vote.
Putting aside racial acrimony, which clearly exists, the 2009 election results 
in the Western Cape make sense if one considers the underlying sentiments of 
voters revealed by opinion polls conducted in the province in december 2008 as 
well as the dramatic series of events which occurred at national level. The dA’s 
campaign of 2009, consistent with its previous hard-hitting messages, now took 
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place in a completely different political context. These public sentiments were 
harnessed by the dA through an extremely effective election campaign.
National events between 2004 and 2009 created a situation where the dA’s 
messages were much more salient to voters in the Western Cape. South Africans 
watched enthralled as Jacob Zuma, then deputy president of the country, faced 
a lengthy and extensively covered rape trial. While he was eventually acquitted 
of the rape charges some of his statements under oath about HIV made him the 
object of scorn and ridicule. This response, in turn, was met with virulent anger by 
his supporters, who thronged outside the court. The trial also resulted in hostile 
clashes between gender activists and supporters of Zuma. 
This matter was followed by the protracted and well publicised corruption 
trial of Schabir Shaik, a close associate of Zuma, who was found guilty – the 
basis of the conviction hinging on payments he had made to Zuma. Following 
this conviction then president Thabo Mbeki relieved Zuma of his role as deputy 
president, installing Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka as the new deputy president. 
This, as Southall (2009, p 3) indicates, left Zuma with only his party platform from 
which to campaign for the presidency of the ANC, to be decided at the ANC’s 
52nd national conference. In the meantime, the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA) decided to press ahead with fraud and corruption charges against Zuma. 
despite this decision Zuma was elected as the ANC’s new president, defeating 
Thabo Mbeki in his bid to remain party president. As Butler (2009, p 69) points 
out, this unprecedented defeat of an incumbent ANC president was followed by 
a wave of instability during which officeholders were ‘recalled’ and perceived 
Mbeki-loyalists purged. The ANC was polarised into antagonistic Mbeki and 
Zuma blocs (Booysen 2009, p 91). As Booysen (2009, p 90) writes, the ANC ‘entered 
a spiral of contestation between Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki centring on issues 
of succession and incumbency’. The culmination of this contest was the removal 
of Thabo Mbeki from his role as president of the country. 
In September 2008, just more than six months before the 2009 general 
elections, Judge Chris Nicholson delivered a high court judgement which inferred 
that Mbeki and senior members of his Cabinet had interfered with the work of 
the NPA in regard to the decision to prosecute Zuma (Jolobe 2009, p 139). The 
judgement provided the basis for a vote of no confidence in Mbeki. Following 
Mbeki’s televised resignation ANC deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe became 
South Africa’s acting president. These events precipitated the resignation of several 
ANC members and the long-anticipated split in the ANC became a reality. The 
Congress of the People was formed under the leadership of Mosiuoa Lekota and 
Mbhazima Shilowa. 
Following the formation of Cope, the competitiveness of the 2009 campaign 
took on a new edge, with the country witnessing acrimonious and often hostile 
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exchanges between Cope and the ANC. The formation of Cope publicly revealed 
a side of the ANC that voters were unaccustomed to – key ANC leaders lambasted 
Cope in a series of verbal attacks. The conflict between the two parties raised 
fears that the campaign would be disrupted by violence and intimidation and 
local election monitoring groups reconvened. The Election Monitoring Network 
(EMN) appointed a team of 500 politically independent community members 
nationwide to monitor election-related abuse or violence, empowering them to 
take rapid action to resolve conflict where necessary. The South African Civil 
Society Election Coalition (SACSEC), a national initiative of more than 40 non-
governmental and faith-based organisations committed to the conduct of free, 
fair and credible elections, had approximately 2 000 observers observing all facets 
of the elections. 
Reports of disrupted meetings and allegations of voter intimidation became 
commonplace. For example, a press statement released by the EMN reported 
five murders linked to political rivalry in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. 
Monitors in KwaZulu-Natal also recorded instances of traditional leaders denying 
political parties the right to hold meetings and forcing their subjects to join certain 
political parties or face eviction. 
There was also heightened tension more generally, with other political parties 
perceiving that they could profit from the division within the ANC. Meanwhile, 
as Butler (2009, p 69) notes, the NPA’s prosecution of Zuma on corruption and 
fraud charges (dropped only in March 2009) perpetuated the divisions of the 
succession struggle and initiated a period of ‘extravagant and sometimes violence-
inciting rhetoric directed at the NPA, the judiciary and purported plotters against 
Zuma’. 
In the Western Cape these national events had a very damaging effect on 
perceptions of Zuma. An Afrobarometer survey conducted in late 2008 revealed 
that respondents in the Western Cape had very little trust in him. As figure 3 
shows, only 13 per cent of respondents in the province, compared to 70 per cent 
in KwaZulu-Natal and 68 per cent in Mpumalanga, said they trusted Zuma 
‘always’ or ‘most of the time’. 
Perceptions of the trustworthiness of a political leader are critically 
important because they help voters to make judgements about the authenticity 
and persuasiveness of the messages put out by the leader. Campaign messages 
delivered by political parties and leaders perceived as trustworthy will be received 
more positively, allowing voters to engage more positively with the content of 
the message. According to Newman & Perloff (2004, p 27) ‘persuasion experts 
unquestionably agree that the source of a message can significantly influence 
political attitudes’. Indeed, the literature reveals that in most situations people 
accept or reject persuasive messages based on their evaluation of the credibility 
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of the source of the message (Milburn 1991; Lupia & McCubbins 2000; Iyengar & 
Valentino 2000; Popkin & dimock 2000; Newman & Perloff 2004). 
 In addition to the national events outlined above ANC structures in 
the Western Cape were beset by their own problems. They were ‘in a complete 
shambles and the NEC [National Executive Council] had to rescue the province 
after an orgy of defections, expulsions and proliferations of parallel structures’ 
(Butler 2009, p 70). As a result, Ebrahim Rasool was removed as premier and 
replaced by Lynne Brown just months prior to the election. The ANC’s carefully-
planned low-key campaigns of 1999 and 2004, which had successfully allayed 
the fears of voters in the province, were now undermined by a barrage of media 
images which contradicted the party’s messages.
 It was in this context that the dA ran a well organised and focused 
campaign under the banner  ‘One Nation One Future’. Its message could be 
summarised by the slogans of two campaign posters: ‘Vote to win’ and ‘Stop 
Zuma’ (daniel & Southall 2009, p 237). The party’s previous election campaigns 
had lacked salience when there were no problems. The 1999 ‘fight back’ campaign 
and the key message of 2004 that ‘South Africa deserves better’ could be countered 
as being unnecessarily dramatic or even unpatriotic, but messages about the 
supremacy of the Constitution and the challenges to democracy posed by ANC 
dominance now resonated with voters. In the Western Cape these messages clearly 
fell on fertile ground.
Figure 3
Trust in Jacob Zuma (by province), 2008
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The impact of the dA’s election of Helen Zille as its new leader cannot be 
under estimated. Her election put to rest criticisms that the party was being 
pulled in different directions. Booysen (2005, p 143) had noted the perception 
that the dA of 2004 was divided by the divergent styles and orientations of Tony 
Leon and Helen Zille. Certainly Zille presented a more likeable persona, which 
endeared her to voters. Indeed, Jolobe (2009, p 31) attributes the rebranding of the 
dA under the leadership of Zille (who, during her term as Cape Town’s mayor 
won the 2008 World Mayor of the Year Award) as one of the key reasons for the 
dA’s success in the Western Cape.  
Furthermore, ANC members who left to join Cope lent credibility to the dA’s 
messages. As Booysen (2009, p 92) argues, Cope’s criticisms of the ANC with 
regard to constitutionalism, the rule of law, and electoral reform resonated with 
many voters who questioned aspects of the ANC’s 15-year rule. These were the 
very issues around which the dA had run its 1999 and 2004 campaigns. 
daniel & Southall (2009, p 243) indicate that the ANC’s monumental loss 
in the Western Cape could be seen as a self-inflicted disaster, ‘a result of vicious 
factionalism which took on a racial form’. And Butler (2009, p 84) argues that the 
ANC ‘lost the province in the worst way possible in that its action and inaction 
had precipitated a major and probably irreversible shift in sentiment among 
coloured voters’.
VOTING TRENdS ANd PATTERNS IN THE WESTERN CAPE, 1994-2009
This overview of electoral trends and concomitant political developments in 
the Western Cape provides several useful insights. It reveals that parties in the 
province were primarily responsible for their own gains and losses. The results 
also suggest that national political developments are a crucial influence on voter 
perceptions. Furthermore, it appears that party behaviour, campaign messages 
and events between elections are important to voters. The NNP’s support base 
was decimated by its incongruent and internally inconsistent campaign messages, 
organisational difficulties and national political developments between 1994 
and 2004. The confidence the ANC had gradually begun to gain among voters 
was undermined by organisational conflict as well as by national political 
developments between 2004 and 2009. Although there were policy contradictions 
and divergent leadership styles in 2004, the dA’s campaign themes have been 
consistent over time. In addition, the party galvanised under a new leader and 
vision and its campaign messages took on a new salience in 2009. 
This overview also highlights a critical gap in our understanding of 
the interactions between political developments and the decisions made by 
voters. In the Western Cape it appears that voters reviewed evolving political 
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developments and then rewarded and/or punished contesting parties by 
granting or withholding their votes. It is very hard to say which outcome would 
not elicit comments about racial or identity-related determinants of voting. These 
trends would hardly have been shocking if the region consisted of an entirely 
homogenous electorate. The results in the province since 1994 suggest that 
voters in the Western Cape are active agents who actually interpret and evaluate 
campaigns as well as other politically relevant stimuli. This conforms to the 
accountability-enhancing context described by renowned theorists diamond & 
Morlino (2005, p xix), who state that democracy requires genuinely competitive 
elections in which the performance of the incumbent is reviewed, policy 
alternatives are debated and voters reward or punish incumbents. People in the 
Western Cape also appear to fit Achen’s (1992, p 198) description of voters who 
‘do not ignore information they have, do not fabricate information they do not 
have, and do not choose what they do not want’. 
What, then, is the problem? It is that election campaigns can be used as a 
platform from which to evoke prejudices and fears (Kuklinski & Quirk 2000). 
Election campaigns and the messages politicians send out to the electorate play 
a critical role in reducing or exacerbating racial or ethnic tensions. Given their 
preconceived notions about voting blocs, parties and political leaders can and 
often do engage in racially inflammatory rhetoric in attempts to win votes. This, 
in turn, fuels racial tension between those groups. 
Clearly race and other forms of identity are a salient factor in the Western 
Cape. As Mattes, Giliomee and James (1996, p 149) indicate, Western Cape citizens 
of different race groups are confronted with very different forms of persuasion 
and information networks as well as different economic positions. Furthermore, 
in a context of scarce resources and given the fact that as Schrire (1999, p 138) 
points out, ‘politics in all contexts involves a struggle for power between 
competing groups and interests over the issue of control over the instruments of 
power’, such identities are likely to remain salient. It is precisely because of the 
salience of identity that political parties need to move away from racial campaign 
strategies. 
CONCLUSION
There is a destructive cycle wherein political commentators and analysts as well 
as campaign strategists attach special significance to the vote of a particular 
demographic bloc, in this case, ‘coloured voters’. These expectations feed, in turn, 
into the choices and actions of political parties. Perceptions of the importance 
of these voters also result in campaigning that encompasses unintentional or 
deliberate racial mobilisation and inflammatory political rhetoric. In the Western 
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Cape racialised mudslinging has characterised election campaigns. While there is 
an Electoral Code of Conduct which commits all parties to a range of provisions 
related to electioneering (Lodge & Scheidegger 2005, pp 7-8), parties still exercise 
a choice over the ways in which they conduct their campaigns. Thus, parties may 
operate within the framework of the code of conduct but continue to engage in 
negative practices which exacerbate the strains between groups. 
After the election, results are almost invariably analysed through references to 
racial fault lines and the racially based motivations of voters. These explanations 
rest primarily on the characteristics of the electorate. Instead of reverting to the 
default explanation that voters vote on the basis of identity, parties need to start 
taking responsibility for their behaviour rather than blaming voters for their 
misfortunes. 
Given that racial and other cleavages are important, it is incumbent 
upon parties to take cognisance of the negative implications of their racially 
inflammatory rhetoric. The incentive of electoral victory simply does not justify 
appeals to prejudice and fear. Not only are such appeals damaging, in many 
instances they plainly do not work. Parties fail when they predicate their campaign 
strategies on mistaken assumptions about what the ‘coloured voter’ wants. Parties 
can and should move toward more inclusive campaign strategies. Questions such 
as ‘how do we make inroads into the coloured vote?’ or ‘how do we retain coloured 
support?’ should be replaced with ‘how do we promote/retain our credibility 
as a political party?’, ‘what are the most salient issues facing this region?’, ‘how 
will we deal with these issues?’, ‘what central message should we communicate?’, 
‘how best can that message be communicated to voters?’ and so on. 
It is not voters in the Western Cape who are the problem – they are willing 
and able to gather and process political information. And as several authors have 
argued, coloured voters do not vote as a monolithic voting bloc. It is political 
parties that should stop blaming voters for their woes and move away from 
racial mobilisation, instead focusing on improving their credibility, developing 
defensible records and proposing policies. Finally, it is time that our analyses 
move to a more nuanced level which does not legitimate racialised campaign 
strategies and does not allow parties to neglect their duty to provide voters with 
adequate information.
27Volume 9  No 2
––––– REFERENCES –––––
Achen, C H. 1992. ‘Social Psychology, demographic Variables, and Linear Re-
gression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research’. Political Behaviour 
14(3).
Africa, C J. 1996. ‘Voting in the 1994 general election:  the role of race, unemployment 
and perceptions of violence in the Western Cape’. Unpublished thesis. 
University of Cape Town.
Booysen, S. 2005. ‘The democratic Alliance: Progress and Pitfalls’. In J Piombo & 
L Nijzink (eds). Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic 
Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
–––––. 2009. ‘Congress of the People: Between Foothold of Hope and Slippery 
Slope’. In R Southall & J daniel (eds). Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections. 
Johannesburg: Jacana Media.
Breytenbach, W. 1999. ‘The New National Party’. In A Reynolds (ed). Election ‘99: 
From Mandela to Mbeki. Cape Town: david Philip. 
Butler, A. 2009. ‘The ANC’s National Election Campaign of 2009: Siyanqoba!’. 
In R Southall & J daniel (eds). Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections. 
Johannesburg: Jacana Media.
Calland, R. 1999. ‘democratic Government, South African style 1994-1999’. In 
A Reynolds (ed). Election ‘99: From Mandela to Mbeki. Cape Town: david 
Philip.
daniel, J & R Southall. 2009. ‘The National and Provincial Outcome: Continuity 
with Change’. In R Southall & J daniel (eds). Zunami! The 2009 South African 
Elections. Johannesburg: Jacana Media.
davis, G. 2005. ‘Media Coverage and the Election: Were some parties more equal 
than others?’ In J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds). Electoral Politics in South Africa: 
Assessing the First Democratic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
democratic Alliance. 2004. The Democratic Alliance 2004 General Election Manifesto. 
Available at: www.da.org.za/da/Site/Eng/campaigns/2004/manifesto.
asp.
diamond, L & L Morlino. 2005. ‘Introduction’. In L diamond & L Morlino (eds). 
Assessing the Quality of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
Edighji, O. 2004. ‘Fear Versus Freedom: Minority Parties and the ANC’. Election 
Synopsis 1(2).
Eldridge, M & J Seekings. 1995. An Uphill Battle: Voter Attitudes and ANC Strategy 
in the 1994 South African Elections. Cape Town: Centre for African Studies, 
University of Cape Town. 
JourNAl of AfricAN electioNs28
Election Monitoring Network. 2009. Election Monitoring Network Press Statement. 
www.idasa.org.za/gbOutputFiles asp?WriteContent=Y&RId=2518.
Friedman S. 2005. ‘A Voice for Some: South Africa’s Ten Years of democracy’. 
In J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds). Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the 
First Democratic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Giliomee, H. 1994. ‘The National Party’s Campaign for a Liberation Election’. In 
A Reynolds (ed). Election ‘94: The campaigns, results and future prospects. Cape 
Town: david Philip.
Government Communication and Information System. 2008. South Africa Yearbook 
2007/08. South Africa: Government Communication and Information 
System. 
Habib, A & S Naidu. 1999. ‘Election ‘99: Was there a “coloured” and “Indian” 
vote?’. Politikon 26(2).
Hoeane, T. 2004. ‘Under Strain: The Racial/Ethnic Interpretation of South Africa’s 
2004 Election’. Journal of African Elections 3(2).
Independent Electoral Commission. 1994. ‘1994 National and Provincial Elections’. 
Available at: www.elections.org.za/content/Workarea/downloadAsset.
aspx?id=1282.
Iyengar, S & N A Valentino. 2000. ‘Who Says What? Source Credibility as a Mediator 
of Campaign Advertising’. In A Lupia, M d McCubbins & S L Popkin (eds). 
Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Johnson, R W. 1996. ‘The 1994 Election: Outcome and Analysis’. In R W Johnson & 
L Schlemmer (eds). Launching Democracy in South Africa. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Jolobe, Z. 2009. ‘The democratic Alliance: Consolidating the Official Opposition’. 
In R Southall & J daniel (eds). Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections. 
Johannesburg: Jacana Media.
Kotze, H A. 2001. ‘Consummation devoutly To be Wished: The democratic Alliance 
and Its Potential Constituencies’. Democratization 8(1).
Kuklinski, J H & P J Quirk. 2000. ‘Reconsidering the Rational Public’. In A Lupia, 
M d McCubbins & S L Popkin (eds). Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and 
the Bounds of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lodge, T. 1994. ‘The African National Congress and Its Allies’. In A Reynolds (ed). 
Election ‘94: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects. Cape Town: david 
Philip. 
–––––. 1999. ‘The African National Congress’. In A Reynolds (ed). Election ‘99:From 
Mandela to Mbeki. Cape Town: david Philip. 
–––––. 2002. Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki. Cape Town: david 
Philip. 
29Volume 9  No 2
–––––. 2005. ‘The African National Congress: There is no Party Like It; Ayikho 
Efana Nayo’. In J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds). Electoral Politics in South Africa: 
Assessing the First Democratic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
––––– & U Scheidegger. 2005. Political Parties and Democratic Governance in South 
Africa. EISA Research Report No 25. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of 
Southern Africa.
Lupia, A & M d McCubbins. 2000. ‘The Institutional Foundations of Political 
Competence: How Citizens Learn What They Need to Know’. In A Lupia, 
M d McCubbins & S L Popkin (eds). Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and 
the Bounds of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Magubane, B. 2000. ‘Race and democratisation in South Africa: Some Reflections’. 
In Y Muthien, M Khosa & B Magubane (eds). Democracy and Governance 
Review: Mandela’s Legacy 1994-1999. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research 
Council. 
Mattes, R B, H Giliomee & W James. 1996. ‘The Election in the Western Cape’. In 
R W Johnson & L Schlemmer (eds). Launching Democracy in South Africa. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Mattes, R B & A Gouws. 1998. ‘Race, Ethnicity, and Voting Behaviour: Lessons from 
South Africa’. In T d Sisk & A Reynolds (eds). Elections and Conflict Management 
in Africa. Washington, dC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Mattes, R B & J Piombo. 2001. ‘South Africa’s General Election of 1999’. 
Democratization 8(3). 
Mattes, R B, H Taylor & C Africa. 1999. ‘Judgement and Choice in the 1999 South 
African Election’. Politikon 26(2). 
Mattes, R.B. 1995. The Election Book: Judgement and Choice in South Africa’s 1994 
Election. Cape Town: Institute for democracy in South Africa. 
–––––. 2005. ‘Voter Information, Government Evaluations and Party Images, 1994-
2004’. In J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds). Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing 
the First Democratic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Milburn, M A. 1991. Persuasion and Politics: The Social Psychology of Public Opinion. 
California: Brooks Cole Publishing Company. 
Newman, B I & E M Perloff. 2004. ‘Political Marketing: Theory, Research and 
Applications’. In L L Kaid (ed). Handbook of Political Communication Research. 
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. 
New National Party. 1999. Our Blueprint for Real Democracy. South Africa: New 
National Party.
–––––. 2004. The NNP’s CAPE PLAN 2010: Blueprint for a World-class Province. South 
Africa: New National Party.
–––––. 2004. Manifesto 2004: New National Party: you deserve a fair share. South Africa: 
New National Party.
JourNAl of AfricAN electioNs30
Ndletyana, M. 1999. ‘The United democratic Movement: A Critical Assessment’. 
Politikon 26(2).
Nijzink, L & S Jacobs. 2000. ‘Provincial elections and government formation in the 
Western Cape: The Politics of Polarisation’. Politikon 27(1).
Piombo, J. 2005. ‘The Results of Election 2004: Looking Back, Stepping Forward’. 
In J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds). Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the 
First Democratic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Popkin, S L & M A dimock. 2000. ‘Knowledge, Trust, and International Reasoning’. 
In A Lupia, M d McCubbins & S L Popkin (eds). Elements of Reason: Cognition, 
Choice and the Bounds of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Reynolds, A. 1994. ‘The Results’. In A Reynolds (ed). Election ‘94: The Campaigns, 
Results and Future Prospects. Cape Town: david Philip. 
–––––. 1999. ‘The Results’. In A Reynolds (ed). Election ‘99:From Mandela to Mbeki. 
Cape Town: david Philip. 
SAIRR. 2007/2008. South African Survey.
Schire, R. 2001. ‘The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies 
and Consequences’. In R Southall (ed). Democratization Special Issue: Opposition 
and Democracy in South Africa. 
Schlemmer, L. 1999. democracy or democratic Hegemony? The Future of Political 
Pluralism in South Africa. In H Giliomee & C Simkins (eds). The Awkward 
Embrace: One Party Domination and Democracy. Cape Town: Tafelberg 
Publishers. 
Schulz-Herzenberg, C. 2005. ‘The New National Party: The End of The Road’. In 
J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds). Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First 
Democratic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
–––––. 2009. ‘Trends in Party Support and Voting Behaviour, 1994-2009’. In 
R Southall & J daniel (eds). Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections. 
Johannesburg: Jacana Media.
Schnur, d. 1999. ‘Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Co-ordinating the Paid and 
Earned Media Message’. In B I Neuman (ed). Handbook of Political Marketing. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Silke, d & R Schrire. 1994. ‘The Mass Media and the South African Election’. In 
A Reynolds (ed). Election ‘94: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects. 
Cape Town: david Philip. 
Sniderman, P M. 2000. ‘Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory’. In A Lupia, M d 
McCubbins & S L Popkin (eds). Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the 
Bounds of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Southall, R. 1998. ‘The Centralization and Fragmentation of South Africa’s 
dominant Party System’. African Affairs 97(389).
31Volume 9  No 2
–––––. 2009. ‘Zunami! The Context of the 2009 Election’. In R Southall & J daniel 
(eds). Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections. Johannesburg: Jacana 
Media.
––––– & J daniel. 2005. ‘The State of Parties Post-election 2004: ANC dominance 
and Opposition Enfeeblement’. In J daniel, R Southall & J Lutchman (eds). 
State of the Nation South Africa: 2004-2005. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Taylor, R & T Hoeane. 1999. ‘Interpreting the South African Election of June 1999’. 
Politikon 26(2).
Weaver, M R. 1996. ‘Paid Media’. In d M Shea (ed). Campaign Craft: The Strategies, 
Tactics, and Art of Political Campaign Management. Westport, Conn: Praeger 
Publishers. 
Welsh, d. 1994. ‘The democratic Party’. In A Reynolds (ed). Election ‘94: The 
Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects. Cape Town: david Philip.
View publication stats
